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CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY: WHEN MAY A
MORTGAGE DEBTOR CURE THE
ACCELERATED MORTGAGE DEBT USING
SECTION 1322(bX5)?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 1322' of the Bankruptcy Act of 19782 deals with the requirements of a plan whereby an individual with regular income attempts to repay at least a portion of his debts using a flexible repayment schedule.8 The purpose of this section is to provide the consumerdebtor who has financially overextended himself with the ability to formulate a workable reorganization plan and to rehabilitate his credit
standing.4 In particular, the intent of Congress is to allow the debtor to
retain his existing assets, such as his home, while still affording protection to the interests of his creditors.6
This comment will focus upon the application of Section 1322
(b)(5) to allow a debtor to cure a mortgage default on his residence.
This situation may best be illustrated by the following hypothetical.
Tom is an individual with a regular income.' He has suffered a
temporary financial crisis due to a three-month strike at his place of
work and medical expenses stemming from his wife's illness.7 As a result, he failed to make his house payment of $245 for four months. In
other words, Tom has defaulted on his mortgage by failing to pay his
monthly installment.'
Home Mortgage Company financed Tom's home for $32,000 over
thirty years. Home Mortgage is the mortgagee and Tom is the mortgagor. In response to Tom's default, Home Mortgage exercises a clause,
standard in most mortgage agreements, to accelerate the mortgage. An

1. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. IV 1980).
2. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
3. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1322.01, at 1322-23 (15th ed. 1979).
4. H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong.. IstSess. 117-18 (1977).
5. Id. at 118; In re Breuer, 4 Bankr. 499, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
6. As the title indicates, Chapter 13 was designed to provide for the adjustment of debts of
an individual with regular income. I I U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (Supp. IV 1980). See also H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., IstSess. 118-19 (1977).
7. A temporary financial crisis such as when a family member becomes seriously ill or is
laid off from work is the typical situation Chapter 13 was designed to remedy. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1977).
8. "ID]efault is an event in the debtor-creditor relationship which triggers certain consequences [such as an acceleration] ...." DiPierro v. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 8 (2d Cir.
July 20, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file).
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accelerated mortgage means the total amount of the outstanding mort-

gage balance is due immediately.' Home Mortgage also institutes an
action in state court to foreclose on Tom's mortgage.
In an effort to make good on the debts he has accumulated during
his financial crisis and to retain his home, Tom files a petition for bank-

ruptcy under Chapter 13. The filing of Tom's petition automatically
triggers a stay action on any further collection or foreclosure proceedings by Home Mortgage. In his debt repayment plan, Tom implements
1322(b)(5) to cure his default.1 0 To effectuate this cure, he proposes to
repay the four months of missed payments or arrearages he owes Home

Mortgage during the first year of the plan while continuing to make his
regular monthly payments as agreed under the original mortgage
contract.
Through this proposal, Tom is attempting to "de-accelerate" his
mortgage by reinstating the original payment schedule11 and "cure his
default" by paying off the arrearages while making his regular mortgage payment.12
Home Mortgage opposes Tom's attempt to cure claiming that by
reason of the acceleration and foreclosure action, Tom's mortgage is
due immediately in full payment and is no longer curable. Home Mortgage objects to Tom's plan and seeks relief from the automatic stay in
order to continue its foreclosure action.
The difficulty facing the bankruptcy court in deciding to permit
Tom's bankruptcy plan is whether such a curing effect is allowed once
Home Mortgage has accelerated the mortgage and begun foreclosure
proceedings.
Section 1322(b)(5) which pertains to curing a default in this situation should provide a clear solution. Yet, a reading of this provision
allows a variety of interpretations and no clear solution."'
In an attempt to overcome this difficulty and derive a solution, this
comment will discuss the legislative history and debate concerning
Chapter 13. This comment will also explore the purpose and mechanics
of Chapter 13. In addition, it will analyze the various interpretations of
Section 1322(b)(5) to determine the most viable view.

9. In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189, 194 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
10. II U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
II. Taddeo, No. 81-5053. slip op. at 1 8, 12.
12. In other words, curing a default means taking care of the triggering event, paying off
the arrearages, and returning to pre-default conditions. Thus, the original payment schedule is
reinstated and the consequences of default are nullified. Id.
13. These problems are presented in Section IV on Judicial Interpretation and discussed in

Section V on Analysis.
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COMMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CHAPTER

13

AND SECTION

1322(b)(5)

The pertinent provisions of Section 1322(b) state:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims;
(3) provide for the curing or waiving of any default;
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the cur-

ing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim
on which the last payment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due;
14

To provide the reader with an understanding of how the above sections
of 1322(b) operate, a look at the legislative history of Chapter 13 is

necessary.
In October of 1978, Congress passed H.R. 82006 which has become known as the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. ''so This law became effective on October 1, 197917 and essentially repealed the previously existing Bankruptcy Act of 1898.1'
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is entitled
"Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income."" This
Chapter was patterned after Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 as amended by the 1938 Chandler Act. 0 Chapter XIII was
known as the "Wage Earners' Plan"" and was limited to those individ14. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (Supp. IV 1980) (in pertinent part).
15. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
16. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 spans approximately ten years. The root of the act was cultivated in 1968
when the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings to determine if a commission should be
formed to review the existing bankruptcy laws. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States was formed. The Commission studied the current bankruptcy laws, filed a report of
recommendations and findings, and proposed a statute revamping these laws. With the proposed
statute in hand, Congress began in 1973 the tremendous task of formulating a bill which would
pass. After a period of inactivity in 1973 due to the Watergate crisis, Congress resumed its task in
1974 and completed the final draft of the bill on October 6, 1978. Klee, Legislative History of the
New Bankruptcy Law, 54 Am. BANKR. L. J. 275 (1980).
17. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
18. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (Supp. IV 1980).
20. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1300.01, at 1300-10-1I (15th ed. 1979); Chandler Act,
ch 575, §§ 601-686, 52 Stat. 840, 930-38 (1938) (repealed 1978, previously codified at I I U.S.C.
§9 1001-86).
21. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118-19 (1977). See Chandler Act, ch 575, §
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uals whose principal income was derived from wages, salary or commissions." Chapter 13 of the new act was designed to cure the inadequacies of Chapter XIII.' a In short, Chapter 13 was designed to allow an
individual to devise and perform a plan to repay his debts over an extended period under the supervision and protection of the court." ' This
chapter places a larger emphasis on favoring the consumer-debtor as
against the creditor in order to improve and enhance the ability of the
debtor to reorganize."
Section 1322(b)(5), however, has no predecessor in Chapter XIII
of the 1898 Act. In the Act of 1898, secured creditors were not required to participate in a Chapter XIII plan unless they consented to
it.' 6 Furthermore, real estate mortgages were not considered as claims
which could be included in the plan.'7 Holders of these mortgages were
permitted to continue to enforce their interests against the debtor who
had filed in bankruptcy. 8
Because of the enforcement ability of the real estate mortgage
creditors, the courts developed a practice under Chapter XIII to postpone the creditor's enforcement of the mortgage lien where such postponement would contribute to a worthy rehabilitation of the debtor .2
In Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 0 the court held
that a bankruptcy court could use its equitable injunctive powers to

606(3), 52 Stat. 840, 930 (1938) (repealed 1978, previously codified at II U.S.C. § 1006(3)).
22. Chandler Act, ch 575, § 606(8), 52 Stat. 840, 931 (1938) (repealed 1978, previously
codified at I I U.S.C. § 1006(8)).
23. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 117-18 (1977). Chapter 13 encompasses a
wider range of debtors including self-employed individuals and recepients of government transfers
(e.g. social security and welfare) as well as wage earners. It makes a more simplified, flexible plan
available for the consumer debtor. It attempts to circumvent private action which had previously
undone the beneficial effects of a Chapter XIII reorganization. It provides the debtor with adequate protections and exemptions to ensure a fresh start for the debtor. And finally, the bankruptcy process is modified to prevent a close relationship from developing between the judge and
the trustee to the detriment of the debtor. Id. at 117-19.
24. Id. at 118.
25. Id.
26. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 652 (repealed 1978, previously codified at I I U.S.C. §
1052); Thompson v. Great Lakes Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 17 Bankr. 748, 751 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1982).
27. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 606 (repealed 1978, previously codified at II U.S.C. §
1006); Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 751-52.
28. Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 752.
29. Id. United Companies Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 Bankr. 178, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1980). "Under the old Bankruptcy Act, a bankruptcy court could enjoin a mortgage from foreclosure so long as the injunction did not impair the value of the mortgagee's security and the mortgagee received no less than the payments provided for in the mortgage." DiPierro v. Taddeo, No. 815033, slip op. at n. 7 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library,
Cases file) (citing Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); Akron
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Freed & Co., 534 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir. 1976)).
30. Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
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prevent the foreclosure of a mortgage on a debtor's residence where the
debt had been accelerated according to the terms of the contract." The
court reasoned that a Chapter XIII plan did not need to give the mortgagee all the protection found in the contract because 3 2 the injunction
would not impair the security of the lien and the mortgagee would not
be required to accept less than the full payments stated in the contract.33 The court found these requirements met by a plan which paid
any arrearages or back payments by the end of the plan while the
debtor continued regular payments."
Section 1322(b)(5) is a statutory codification of this judicial protection of a debtor's assets. This judicial practice equally protected the
creditor to the extent of his secured position. This protection of the
creditor's interest did not necessarily extend to the same degree provided by the contract or state law. Rather, it was based on equitable
terms to aid in the effectuation of a Chapter XIII plan.
The legislative history of Chapter 13 as it was formulated from
the initial Commission Report to the final draft is fairly extensive. 3 6
However, the legislative discussions focusing on Section 1322(b)(5) are
sparse.
The Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States3 7 realized the diverse application of Chapter XIII
throughout the country and the difficulties caused by the fact that a
Chapter XIII plan could not include any claim secured by real property." The Commission acknowledged the practice outlined by the
Hallenbeck court 3 ' and recommended "[t]he debtor be able to include
in his plan a proposal for paying debts secured by liens on his residence
and curing defaults thereon within a reasonable time."' 0 The Commission's bill, § 6-201(2) and (4)"1 plainly permitted a cure and de-ac31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Brantley. 6 Bankr. at 190.

36. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. I & 11 (1973).

LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

37. Id.
38. Id.. pt. I at 165.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 13.
41. Id., pt. I! at 204. Section 6-201 provides in pertinent part:
A plan under this chapter may provide for a composition or an extension of indebtedness,
or for a composition of some and an extension of other indebtedness, and

(2) may include provisions dealing with claims secured by personal property severally, on
any terms, and may provide for the curing of defaults within a reasonable time and otherwise alter or modify the rights of the holders of such claims;
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celertion of the mortgage on the debtor's residence to enable the debtor
to keep his home. 42 The Commission concluded that because Chapter
XII, which dealt with claims secured by real property, would not be
included in the new act, there was no reason to preclude relief to a
debtor who proposed to pay out of his future income a debt secured by
his residence.43
The House, in its first version of the new bankruptcy bill, essentially enacted the Commission's bill." In its report accompanying the
bill, the House provided a section-by-section analysis of each provision."a No new insight into the meaning of Section 1322(b)(5) was
given, however. The analysis simply stated that this paragraph concerned long-term debt, such as mortgage debt, and permitted a Chapter 13 plan to cure a default within a reasonable time."
The only changes affecting Section 1322(b)(5) are found in S.
2266 and in the final draft. The Senate in S. 2266 adopted a prohibition against modification of a claim secured by mortgages on real property.47 A modification generally means the holder of the claim will be
entitled to an amount less than the total debt against the debtor. 4s The
House accepted this change as it applied to claims secured by the
debtor's residence:
Section 1322(b)(2) of the House amendment represents a compromise
agreement between similar provisions in the House bill and Senate
amendment. Under the House amendment, the plan may modify the
rights of holders of secured claims other than a claim secured by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence. It is
intended that a claim secured by the debtor's principal residence may be
treated . . . under Section 1322(b)(5) of the House amendment.,

The final wording of Section 1322(b)(5) reflected this compromise

(4) may include provisions for the curing of defaults within a reasonable time and the
maintenance of payments while the case is pending on claims secured by a lien on the
debtor's residence and on unsecured claims or claims secured by personal property on
which the last payment is due after completion by the debtor of all payments under the
plan; Id.
These sections are the predecessors to § 1322(b)(5) of the House and Senate versions of the
Bankruptcy Act.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
ed. Oct.

Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at
See supra note 36, pt. I at 166.
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
Id. at 429.
S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., §
Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at
124 CONG. REC. HI 1,106 (daily
6, 1978).

8.
(1977).
Ist Sess. 308-467 (1977).
1322(b)(5) (1978).
I1.
ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17,423 (daily
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agreement between the House and Senate by including the preface
"notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection."' 0 This preface
merely adds to the confusion of interpreting Section 1322(b)(5). For
example, Section 1322(b)(5) may now be interpreted as a subset of
Section 1322(b)(2) or as superseding Section 1322(b)(2).
In sum, the legislative history of Chapter 13 and Section
1322(b)(5) provides little insight into the proper interpretation of Section 1322(b)(5). What is clear, is the intent of Congress to provide the
consumer-debtor with an effective means to retain his residence while
proceeding under a Chapter 13 plan." What is unclear is whether this
curing method may be used when the default has resulted in either an
acceleration of the mortgage debt or a final foreclosure judgment.5
III.

PURPOSE AND MECHANICS OF CHAPTER

13

The principal purpose of Chapter 13 is rehabilitation of the consumer-debtor' 3 by enabling an individual with regular income to develop and perform a plan to repay his debts over a period of time, while
protecting the interests of his creditors." By agreeing to repay his
debts, the individual is permitted to protect his assets which, under a
Chapter 7 liquidation plan, would be lost. 65 Proceeding under Chapter
13 provides the debtor with an opportunity to stand on his own again"
7
and gain a "fresh start" as a consumer.
The mechanics of Chapter 13 can be adequately illustrated by referring to the hypothetical situation outlined earlier. Once Tom files for
bankruptcy under Chapter 13, an automatic stay provision is trig-

gered.58 This automatic stay enjoins all collection efforts by Home
Mortgage, such as the foreclosure proceeding directed against Tom and
his property. 9 A trustee is appointed, as in every Chapter 13 case."

50. Compare 124 CONG. REC. Hi1,076 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) with 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1980) (the wording is the same).
51. In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189, 194 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
52. Id.
53. DiPierro v. Cullen (In re Taddeo), 9 Bankr. 299, 303 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 15

Bankr. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, No. 81-5053 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982,
on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., IstSess. 118 (1977).
54. DiPierro v. Taddeo, 15 Bankr. 273, 275 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff/d, No. 81-5053 (2d Cir.
July 20, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); H.R. REP. No.

595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977).
55. DiPierro, 15 Bankr. at 275; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., IstSess. 118 (1977).
56. 123 CONG. REC. H11,699 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977).
57.

Id. Vukowich, Debtor's Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58

N.C.L. REV. 769, 801 (1980).
58. Epstein, Chapter 13: Its Operation, Its Statutory Requirements as to Payment to and
Classification of Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 2 (1980).

59. Id. at 3.
60.

Id.
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With the help of the trustee, Tom proposes and timely files a plan outlining how he will repay his debts.0 1 The requirements with which
Tom's plan must meet are found in Section 1322.2 Section 1322 is
divided into three subsections which specify what must be included in
the plan," what may be included in the plan," and what the plan may
not do."'
From the language of subsection (b), which specifies what may be
included in the plan, it is clear that paragraphs two and five should be
read together to determine what effect the plan may have on a claim
secured by the debtor's residence." In addition, paragraph three provides for "the curing or waiving of any default." 677 Section 1322(b)(2),
in pertinent part, prohibits any modification of rights of a claim secured by an interest in the debtor's residence." While most creditors'
claims must be satisfied over the life of the debtor's plan, Section
1322(b)(5) allows the debtor to take advantage of a repayment period
longer than the five-year maximum time imposed on Chapter 13
plans." The debtor can maintain his mortgage payments during the
plan, without suffering an acceleration due to his previous default, by
proposing to cure the default within a reasonable time.70
The language of Section 1322(b)(5) clearly indicates that, notwithstanding Section 1322(b)(2), a debtor may cure a default within a
reasonable time and maintain mortgage payments provided the last
mortgage payment is due after the final payment under the plan.7 1 The

61. Id. at 4.
62. Id. II U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. IV 1980).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Under § 1322(a), the plan must submit that
portion of the debtor's future income necessary for execution of the plan to the trustee; provide for

full payment of priority claims unless the holder agrees otherwise; and provide the same treatment
for each claim within a particular class. Id.
64. Id. § 1322(b). This subsection permits the debtor to: designate a class of unsecured
claims, modify the rights of holders of some secured claims, cure or waive any default; provide for
payments on unsecured claims to be made concurrently with those to secured creditors; cure a
long-term debt: provide for the payment of a post-petition claim; assume or reject an executory
contract or lease; pay a debt using property from his estate; provide for vesting of property; and
include any other appropriate provisions. Id.
65. Id. § 1322(c). Under this subsection, the debtor may not devise a plan of repayment
over a period longer than three years, or with cause shown and court approval, over a period
longer than five years. Id.
66. See In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937, 940 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). But see DiPierro v.
Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 12 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982, on LEXIS,
Bkrtcy library, Cases file) (allows the debtor to serially use § 1322(b)(3) to cure the mortgage
default and then maintain the mortgage payments under § 1322(b)(5)).
67. 11U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
68. Id. § 1322(b)(2).
69. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 1322.01, at 1322-11 (15th ed. 1979).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1322.01, at 1322-11.
71.

Id.
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statutory language, however, does not specify whether Section
1322(b)(5) may be used to cure the debtor's default once the debt is
accelerated, in the process of foreclosure or is part of a foreclosure
judgment. In other words, the crucial, unanswered question is whether
an accelerated debt still qualifies for the Section 1322(b)(5) curing effect by meeting the requirement that its last debt payment becomes
due after the last payment of the Chapter 13 plan.
IV.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

1322(b)(5)

The bankruptcy courts have handed down a variety of decisions on
the question of when a Chapter 13 debtor may attempt to cure a mortgage default on his residence. These decisions have focused on the stage
of the acceleration or foreclosure action. Generally, if the debtor has
defaulted on his mortgage, but the holder of this mortgage has not yet
accelerated his debt, the courts agree that the debtor may use Section
1322(b)(5) to cure his default under the Chapter 13 plan. 7' Also, the
.courts agree73 that after a foreclosure judgment and sale of the property, the debtor may not cure his mortgage default or reinstate the payment schedule. 4 Thus, at both ends of the default spectrum, there is a
substantial consensus. 5
A third point of agreement is that the debtor may not cure a default using Section 1322(b)(5) where the debtor has no equity in his
residence.7 A debtor has equity in his residence equal to the amount
by which the current fair market value of his residence exceeds the
-amount due and owing under the mortgage agreement. 7 A debtor has
no equity if the balance due on his mortgage exceeds the fair market
value of his residence. 78 In the event the debtor has no equity, the creditor may request and receive relief from the automatic stay and proceed

72. See In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189, 193 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
73. Contra Thompson v. Great Lakes Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 17 Bankr. 748 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1982) (holding that § 1322(b)(5) permits a cure of mortgage default regardless of acceleration and foreclosure sale, as long as the debtor still has an interest in the mortgaged property
under state law); In re Lynch, 12 Bankr. 533 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981) (holding that a debtor
may cure using § 1322(b)(5) after the foreclosure sale of the residence provided there has been no
confirmation of sale).
74. See Pearson, 10 Bankr. at 193; Administrator of Veterans' Affairs v. Sparkman, 9
Bankr. 359, 363 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Butchman, 4 Bankr. 379, 380-81 (Bankr. S.D.
N.Y. 1980); Benford-Whiting Co. v. Robertson, 4 Bankr. 213, 216 (Bankr. D. Col. 1980).
75. Pearson, 10 Bankr. at 193.
76. See Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. Stewart, 16 Bankr. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re
Lynch, 12 Bankr. 533 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); Roosevelt Say. Bank v. Branch, 10 Bankr. 227
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
77. Branch, 10 Bankr. at 229.
78. Id.
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with a foreclosure action.7 9 Unitemized interest, late charges, attorney's
fees, and escrow deficit should not be considered as part of the mortgage amount due in deciding the question of equity.80
The courts are, however, in spite of their agreements in other areas, troubled by the lack of legislative guidance concerning the question
of curing accelerated mortgage debts. Faced with this, many bankruptcy courts"1 have analyzed the comparable provision under Chapter
11 which deals with the debt modification allowed under business reorganizations. Section 1124(2) allows business debtors to cure any default and to reinstate the original mortgage payment schedule regardless of whether the creditor had accelerated the debt by a contractual
provision or by a foreclosure judgment.82
The legislative history of Section 1124 indicates that permitting

79. See Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. Stewart, 16 Bankr. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re
Lynch, 12 Bankr. 533 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); Roosevelt Say. Bank v. Branch, 10 Bankr. 227
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). II U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. IV 1980) provides in pertinent part:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant
relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating,
annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay(2) with respect to a stay of an action against property, if (A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
80. Stewart, 16 Bankr. at 462.
81. DiPierro v. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 14 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available
Sept. I, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); Mid Am. Credit Union v. Davis, 16 Bankr.
473, 475 (D. Kan. 1981); Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 753 ; In re Allen, 17 Bankr. 119, 123 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Jenkins, 14 Bankr. 748, 750 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1981); In re Williams, II
Bankr. 504, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981); Pearson, 10 Bankr. at 193-94; Retreat Inv. Corp. v.
Canady, 9 Bankr. 428, 430 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); DiPierro v. Cullen (In re Taddeo), 9 Bankr.
299, 302-03 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), affid, 15 Bankr. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), a.Fd, No. 81-5053 (2d
Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. I, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file).
82. I! U.S.C. § 1124(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 1124 states:
Except as provided in Section 1123(a)(4) of this title, a class of claims or interests is
impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each claim or interest of such class, the
plan(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law that entitles the holder of
such claim or interest to demand or receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest
after the occurrence of a default(A) cures any such default, other than a default of a kind specified in section
365(b)(2) of this title, that occurred before or after the commencement of the case
under this title;
(B) reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest as such maturity existed before
such default;
(C) compensates the holder of such claim or interest for any damages incurred as a
result of any reasonable reliance by such holder on such contractual provision or
such applicable law; and
(D) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which such
claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest; or ....
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de-acceleration of mortgage debts is legitimate because the holder of
this interest is restored to his original position while other creditors
may receive little or nothing.8"
One line of authority" reasons that since both Chapters 11 and 13
have the same purpose-debtor rehabilitation and relieP -they should
be read together. This attitude follows the rationale under the old Act
as demonstrated in Hallenbeck"0 where the court read together Chapters XI and XIII to give the bankruptcy referee the power to enjoin
foreclosure. From reading these chapters together, the logical rationale
is that since Chapter 11 permits curing of accelerated mortgage debts
in the interest of the rehabilitation of businesses, the more liberal
Chapter 13 should provide the same curing effect for the consumer87
debtor's rehabilitation.
A second line of authority does not deem Chapter 11 applicable to
Chapter 13. In fact, this view supports the interpretation technique of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In other words, by the language
included in Section 1124, Congress demonstrated its awareness of the
problem presented by accelerated debts and chose not to give the
Chapter 13 debtor the same relief given to the Chapter 11 business
debtor." This reasoning follows a strict, plain meaning rule of statutory
interpretation by refusing to read Section 1124(2) into Chapter 13 even
while recognizing the liberal relief provisions of Chapter 13 seem to
justify such an implication.' 9
A third line of authority"0 claims both of the views expressed
above fail to understand the meaning of Section 1124.91 By determining which creditors will have impaired interests under the business
debtor's plan, Section 1124 defines those creditors who may vote on the
plan." In Section 1124(2), Congress made an exception to impairment
83. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1978).
[A] claim or interest is unimpaired by curing the effect of a default and reinstating the
original terms of an obligation when maturity was brought on or accelerted by the default.
The intervention of bankruptcy and the defaults represent a temporary crisis which the
plan of reorganization is intended to clear away. The holder of a claim or interest who
under the plan is restored to his original position, when others receive less or get nothing at
all, is fortunate indeed and has no cause to complain. Id.
84. Davis, 16 Bankr. at 475; Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 303.
85. Davis, 16 Bankr. at 475.
86. Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
87. Davis, 16 Bankr. at 475; Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 752; Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 303.
88. Allen, 17 Bankr. at 123; Jenkins, 14 Bankr. at 750; Williams, II Bankr. at 506;
Canady, 9 Bankr. at 430.
89. Jenkins, 14 Bankr. at 750.
90. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 14; Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 753.
91. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 14.
92. Id. "Those parties with 'impaired' claims or interest can vote, and § 1124(a) declares
that any change in legal, equitable or contractual rights creates impairment." Id. The creditors
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by providing that curing a default does not impair a creditor's claim. "
This section merely takes away the vote from a creditor in the event of

a cure of default or reinstatement of a claim's maturity." Since creditors are not permitted to vote on a Chapter 13 plan, no discussion of
impairment as found in Section 1124 is necessary."5 Furthermore, the
power to cure a default is found in Section 1124(a)(5)(G) in language
similar to Section 1322(b)(3)."
The dispute among the courts" of whether a Chapter 13 debtor
may cure his mortgage default once the total debt is accelerated or a
final foreclosure judgment is entered may be categorized into three
views:
A. The debtor may cure using Section 1322(b)(5) at any time before a
foreclosure sale of his residence."
B. The debtor may cure using Section 1322(b)(5) even when the mortgage is accelerated provided no foreclosure judgment has been entered."
C. The debtor may not use Section 1322(b)(5) to cure any time after the
mortgage has been accelerated. 10
In the following section, each view will be discussed and analyzed.
In conclusion, the three views will be evaluated in order to determine
which is the more viable interpretation of Section 1322(b)(5).

with impaired claims or interests decide whether to accept or reject the Chapter II business
debtor's repayment plan. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 753.
96. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 14.
97. See, e.g., In re Allen, 17 Bankr. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); in re Pearson, 10 Bankr.
189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); DiPierro v. Cullen (In re Taddeo), 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y.), afd, 15 Bankr. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, No. 81-5053 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982)
(available Sept. I, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library. Cases file).
98. See. e.g.. DiPierro v. Taddeo, No. 81-5053 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. I.
1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); Mid Am. Credit Union v. Davis, 16 Bankr. 473 (D.
Kan. 1981): DiPierro v. Taddeo, 15 Bankr. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), afd,No. 81-5053 (2d Cir. July
20, 1982) (available Sept. I, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); Thompson v. Great
Lakes Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 17 Bankr. 748 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982); In re Barnes, 16
Bankr. 623 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); DiPierro v. Cullen (In re Taddeo), 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y.), affd, 15 Bankr. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd. No. 81-5053 (2d Cir. July 20. 1982)
(available Sept. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); United Companies Fin. Corp. v.
Brantley, 6 Bankr. 178 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980).
99. See, e.g., Percy Wilson Mortgage and Fin. Corp. v. McCurdy, 21 Bankr. 535 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982); First Inv. Co. v. Custer, 18 Bankr. 842 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re
Maiorino, 15 Bankr. 254 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1981); Retreat Inv. Corp. v. Canady, 9 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); Benford-Whiting Co.
v. Robertson, 4 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. D. Col. 1980).
100. See, e.g., Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Soderlund, 18 Bankr. 12 (S.D. Ohio 1981); In
re Allen, 17 Bankr. 119 (Bankr. ND. Ohio 1981); In re Williams, II Bankr. 504 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1981): In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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V.

ANALYSIS

A. The Debtor May Cure Using Section 1322(b)(5) At Anytime
Before a Foreclosure Sale of His Residence.
This view embodies the broadest application of Section
1322(b)(5). Under this view, the debtor may attempt to cure by proposing to pay the pre-acceleration arrearages within a reasonable time
while continuing to make the regular installment payments as required
in the original mortgage agreement.1 01 Such curing is permitted in spite
of an acceleration of the mortgage or the rendering of a foreclosure
judgment secured by the creditor.1 02
Returning to the hypothetical situation, Tom may cure his default
under this view even though Home Mortgage has accelerated his mortgage and received a foreclosure judgment. To cure, Tom must propose
to repay the four months of missed payments within a reasonable time
and to continue his regular $245 monthly payment.
The courts supporting his view recognize the interplay between
Sections 1322(b)(2) and 1322(b)(5). Section 1322(b)(2) does not permit a plan to modify a creditor's right secured by an interest in the
debtor's residence.105 At the same time, however, Section 1322(b)(5)
applies, notwithstanding Section 1322(b)(2), to provide the debtor with
an opportunity to cure any default within a reasonable time and to
maintain payments provided the last payment of this secured claim is
due after the last plan payment.'" The underlying logic of this view is
that the mortgage debt obligation survives the plan period even though
an acceleration of the mortgage and a foreclosure judgment has occurred. Thus, Section 1322(b)(5) may be used to cure the default and
reinstate the mortgage payment schedule.
Central to this view is the premise that the concept of cure in Section 1322(b)(5) contains the power to de-accelerate the mortgage and
reinstate its original payment schedule. 00 This concept of cure follows
the common meaning of "curing a default" as it is used throughout the
Bankruptcy Code.'" Curing a default generally means eliminating the
triggering event and returning to pre-default conditions with the de101. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
102. See, e.g.. DiPierro v. Cullen (In re Taddeo), 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), affid, 15
Bankr. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affid. No. 81-5053 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. I, 1982,
on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
104. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
105. DiPierro v. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 8 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available
Sept. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file).
106. Id. The Second Circuit points out that §§ 365(b), 110(a), and 1168(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 all use this concept of cure. Id.

Published by eCommons, 1982

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8:1

fault-induced consequences nullified.10 7
Furthermore, the position proceeds, the literal language of Section
1322(b)(5) does not limit when a default may be cured.1 06 The critical
phrase for interpretation is "the last payment is due after . . . the plan
is due.""' This phrase cannot refer to the time of payment after acceleration because the acceleration clause is merely a result of default."'
This clause does not eliminate the other terms of the mortgage agreement. In particular, it does not eliminate the original mortgage payment schedule.'
Policy considerations support this view's concept of cure and interpretation of the critical "last payment" phrase. To interpret the phrase
to mean that the post-acceleration time of payment applies, prohibiting
the use of Section 1322(b)(5), would render the curing relief practically nonexistent."' Second, to condition a debtor's right to cure on
having filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy prior to the acceleration of his
mortgage, would encourage creditors to hastily accelerate mortgages
and institute foreclosure proceedings. This would prompt wasteful races
to the courthouse by the debtor and creditor. The likely winner of these
races would be the creditor, as the debtor, more often than not, will be
unfamiliar with the bankruptcy proceedings and will fail to retain
counsel in time to be beneficial."' Third, allowing the debtor to deaccelerate his mortgage by virtue of payment of the arrearages may
encourage the debtor and creditor to negotiate in good faith before us4
ing the court process."
Supporters of this view claim that the drafters of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978'1 intended to allow a debtor under Chapter 13 to protect
his assets, particularly his residence, by agreeing to repay his creditors." 6 The purpose and spirit of Chapter 13, to rehabilitate the debtor
while protecting the interests of the creditors, indicates that a debtor

107.
108.

Id.
Mid Am. Credit Union v. Davis, 16 Bankr. 473, 475 (D. Kan. 1981). With no limita-

tions prescribed, the curing of a default should theoretically be applied until the property is sold
under foreclosure.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
110. First Inv. Co. v. Custer, 18 Bankr. 842, 847 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). While this case
is categorized under view B, it lends persuasive support to view A as well.
I 1. Id.
112. Id. at 847-48; Thompson v. Great Lakes Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 17 Bankr. 748, 753
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982).
113. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 9.
114. Id.
115. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
116. Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 304; In re Breuer, 4 Bankr. 499, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); 124
CONG. REC. S17,423 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); 124 CONG. RIc. Hi,106 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1978).
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may cure defaults on his residential mortgage at any time prior to a
foreclosure sale. 117
The second premise of this view is that the power to cure a default, found in Section 1322(b)(5), is separate from, and not limited
by, the ban on modification of residential mortgages found in Section
1322(b)(2). 8 This assumption is based upon the proposition that curing defaults under Section 1322(b)(5) is not equivalent to modifications
of claims under Section 1322(b)(2)." The preface to Section
1322(b)(5), "notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection," does
not mean Section 1322(b)(5) is subordinate to Section 1322(b)(2).11 0
Rather, it indicates that defaults on mortgages can be cured despite
Section 1322(b)(2). I The final draft of Section 1322,12 along with
the previous proposals, all treat the modification of a claim by reduction of payments as a power separate from the power to cure a default. 123 Even the creditors" 4 themselves view these powers separately.
Finally, the previous practice under the old Bankruptcy Act distinguished between modification of a claim and curing a default." 5
In reviewing other provisions in light of Section 1322(b)(5), the
congressional intent appears to encourage a broad application of curing
defaults. The automatic stay provision,'" for example, is intended by
Congress to help preserve the status quo of the debtor's assets and
maintain economic values.1"7 To find Section 1322(b)(5) inapplicable
due to a foreclosure judgment, opens the way for the creditor to force a
sale. 12 This invites economic waste and preferential treatment for one
creditor while prejudicing the rights of other creditors."'
Since both Chapters 11 and 13 propose debtor rehabilitation as
their main goal and Chapter 11 provides for de-acceleration of the
117. DiPierro v. Taddeo, 15 Bankr. 273, 275-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, No. 81-5053 (2d
Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. I, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); Custer, 18
Bankr. at 846; Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 305.
118. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 10.
119.

Id.

120. Id. at I I].
121. Id.
122. II U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. IV 1980).
123. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at I 11.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. II U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. IV 1980).
127. Custer, 18 Bankr. at 847. Judge Anderson stated, "[t]he intent of Congress in preserving the status quo in all cases must be read into the design and operation of Chapter 13, in having
creditors paid in deference to the losses suffered through a Chapter 7 liquidation and a discharge
in bankruptcy." Id.
128. Id.
129.

Id.
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mortgage debt,'1 0 the more liberal Chapter 13, which was fashioned
after Chapter 11, should apply the same cure.13 1 A specific provision as
is found in Section 1124(2) is not necessary in Chapter 13. Chapter 11
requires specificity to determine those creditors with impaired rights
who qualify to vote on the Chapter 11 plan.1 32 Since creditors do not
vote on a Chapter 13 plan, there is no need for such language to determine impairment of rights.133 Congress' silence, in Section 1322(b)(5)
as compared to Section 1124(2), does not demonstrate a conscious
choice to prohibit de-acceleration under Chapter 13.'"
Congressional intent to allow curing of defaults may also be
surmised as a continuation of the Hallenbeck'" practice under the former Bankruptcy Act. Under this practice, a secured creditor was not
entitled to all the rights provided by the contract but was entitled only
to have his secured interest adequately protected.' 6
Under federal bankruptcy law, the rights of the debtor and creditors are usually determined by state law.' 37 However, where the state
law frustrates federally enacted policy, state law must give way to federal law.'" In most states, a foreclosure judgment affirms the accelerated debt and requires immediate payment in full or, alternatively, a
forced sale. However, a foreclosure judgment cannot preclude the curing action of Section 1322(b)(5), which not only provides protection to
the same degree for the creditor's interest, but also supports the rehabilitative goal by allowing the debtor to keep his home.' 8 '
In the only court of appeals decision on point, the Second Circuit' " strongly supported this view stating,
[w]e do not believe that Congress labored for five years over this controversial question only to remit consumer debtors-tended to be primary
14
beneficiaries of the new Code--to the harsher mercies of state law. 1

130.

See II U.S.C. § 1124(2) (Supp. IV 1980).

131.

Davis, 16 Bankr. at 475 Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 303.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 14; Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 753.
Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 753.
Id.
Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
See Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); Thompson,

17 Bankr. at 752; Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 303-04; United Companies Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 Bankr.
178, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980).
137.
138.
303; U. S.
139.

Davis. 16 Bankr. at 475; DiPierro. 15 Bankr. at 275.
Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 14; Davis, 16 Bankr. at 475; Cullen. 9 Bankr. at
CONST. art. I, § 8, art. VI, cl. 2.
Davis, 16 Bankr. at 475; DiPierro, 15 Bankr. at 275; In re Breuer, 4 Bankr. 499, 502

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
140.

Taddeo, No. 81-5053 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982. on LEXIS,

Bkrtcy library, Cases file).
141.

Id. at tI1.
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To subject the debtor to the mercies of state law would leave the
debtor with fewer rights now than under the previous Bankruptcy
Act." 2 It would also mean that a debtor who defaulted could have his
rights forfeited before the institution of foreclosure proceedings and
most likely even before he knew of his rights under Chapter 13.1 1 This
would be in direct opposition to the rehabilitative goal of Chapter 13.144
In addition to the argument that state law must give way to federal law, state law itself may be interpreted as permitting the cure of a
default even after a foreclosure judgment. Under the law in many
states, once the mortgage has been accelerated due to the debtor's default and a foreclosure judgment secured, the mortgage is said to
merge with the judgment.' 4 6 This merger concept, however, does not
extinguish the mortgage. Generally, the mortgage is not extinguished
until the actual foreclosure sale. The logic of this view is that because
the mortgage survives, even in the midst of a foreclosure judgment, the

default is curable under Section 1322(b)(5). 4'
Finally, equitable reasons support this broad view of curing a default. The secured and unsecured claims which qualify for the curing
treatment of Section 1322(b)(5) are not dischargeable.14 7 Thus, the
debtor must make 100% repayment of these claims. Assuming the
debtor's residential mortgage debt is included as one of these claims, he
must repay the full amount of the mortgage debt. This mortgage debt
may not be modified.14 8 Since a creditor's collateral interest is thus
fully protected, he has no room to complain.'"4 The creditor's interest is
not impaired because the cure of the default arrearages must occur
Within a reasonable time and the full balance must be paid under the
original payment schedule set forth by the creditor. 15 0 A creditor may

142. Id. at 1 16.
,143. Id.
144. Id.
145. In re Jenkins, 14 Bankr. 748, 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); Retreat Inv. Corp. v.
Canady, 9 Bankr. 428, 430-31 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); Brantley, 6 Bankr. at 189.
.146. DiPierro, 15 Bankr. at 276; In re Smith, 19 Bankr. 592, 594 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982);
Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 306; Brantley, 6 Bankr. at 189.
147. Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 304; 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) (these claims are
not dischargeable under the plan but remain as obligations until paid off according to the terms of
the claims).
148. i U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
149. Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 304.
.1,50. Id. Percy Wilson Mortgage and Fin. Corp. v. McCurdy, 21 Bankr. 535, 540 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982). Judge Anderson stated that the court would be unlikely to confirm a plan where
serious delinquencies existed, "in the absence of unscrupulous acceleration, contrived for ulterior
motivation by a mortgagee which is flaunting the fact of the existence of adequate protection of
the mortgage for what the parties originally intended-that is, as security for a loan." Id. While
this case is categorized under view B, language in the case supports view A.
In the current high interest rate economy, a creditor's persistence in trying to deny the debtor
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further protect his interests by having the court approve a settlement
agreement with the debtor which provides for automatic relief from the
stay upon the first default on the arrearage payment schedule or regular monthly installments.151
B. The Debtor May Cure Using Section 1322(b)(5) Even When The
Mortgage Is Accelerated Provided No Foreclosure Judgment Has
Been Entered.
Under this view, a debtor may invoke Section 1322(b)(5) to cure
his default and reinstate his mortgage provided a creditor has not secured a foreclosure judgment. The courts supporting this view rationalize that after the judgment is entered, the entire mortgage debt is due
immediately, not just the amount in arrears. To retain his home, the
debtor must pay the total mortgage debt to the creditor within the
Chapter 13 plan period. The debtor may not use Section 1322(b)(5) to
cure his debt. 15 '
16
The courts supporting this view emphasize the role of state law 3
under which the mortgage is accelerated and merged into the foreclosure judgment.'" The debtor is without a right to reinstate or reactivate the mortgage.1 65 The debtor is required, under state law, to pay
his debt in full and is precluded from any attempt to cure. 15 6
A distinction is made between the curing provisions of Section
1322(b)(5) and Section 1322(b)(3). 1 51 Because the total debt is due,

this right to cure can be attributed more to his desire to get out of the undesirable low interest
rate mortgage contract than to his fear of inadequate protection for his collateral interest. Interview with Charles A. Anderson, Bankruptcy Judge, S.D. Ohio, United States Bankruptcy Court,
in Dayton, Ohio (Aug. 13, 1982) (on file at University of Dayton Law Review).
151. Interview with Jeffrey W. Morris, Assistant Professor of Law at University of Dayton
School of Law (July 7, 1982) (on file at University of Dayton Law Review).
152. See, e.g., Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin. Corp. v. McCurdy, 21 Bankr. 535 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982); First Inv. Co. v. Custer, 18 Bankr. 842 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re
Maiorino, 15 Bankr. 254 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); Advance Mortgage Corp. v. Land, 14 Bankr.
132 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); Retreat Inv. Corp. v. Canady, 9 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981); Benford-Whiting Co. v. Robertson, 4 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
153. Generally, the courts supporting this view emphasize the application and fulfillment of
state laws before applying the federal bankruptcy law. See, e.g., In re Maiorino, 15 Bankr. 254
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); Advance Mortgage Corp. v. Land, 14 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981); In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Retreat Inv. Corp. v. Canady, 9
Bankr. 428 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
154. See, e.g.. In re Maiorino, 15 Bankr. 254 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Jenkins, 14
Bankr. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1981); Advance Mortgage Corp. v. Land, 14 Bankr. 132 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Retreat Inv. Corp. v.
Canady, 9 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
155. Maiorino, 15 Bankr. at 257.
156. Id.
157. Jenkins. 14 Bankr. at 749-50.
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Section 1322(b)(5) is not available to the debtor. " a In addition, although Section 1322(b)(3) also provides for curing of any default, its
use is similarly unavailable to the debtor'" because it is contended that
a consistent reading of Section 1322(b) leads to the conclusion that
where the specific provisions of Sections 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5) apply to
a residential mortgage debt, the more general provision of Section
1322(b)(3) may not be considered. 16
A further differentiation is made between an accelerated debt
which may be cured and a default which has become part of a foreclosure judgment and is not curable. 16 This distinction is based on a perceived interaction of state law and federal bankruptcy law. The argument states that the activation of acceleration clauses in mortgage
contracts, as sanctioned by state law, conflicts directly with the language of Section 1322(b)(5) which provides for the "curing of any default ... "6 Enforcement of these clauses deprives the debtor of the
power to cure his mortgage default under Section 1322(b)(5). The argument continues that "[t]o the extent that acceleration clauses nullify
[Section 1322(b)(5)] . . .they are invalid and will not be enforced."' 8

On the other hand, the proponents of this distinction suggest that
Section 1322(b)(5) contains no language to effect state court judgments.'" Thus, there is no conflict between Section 1322(b)(5) and
state law judgments. Accordingly, since there is no direct conflict, the
state court judgment is enforced and attempts to cure using Section
1322(b)(5) are rejected.'" The argument concludes that congressional
intent was to allow for the curing of defaults, but not for the invalidation of state court judgments."" If Congress had intended to apply the
curing effect of Section 1322(b)(5) to invalidate state foreclosure judgments, it would have indicated this in clear and appropriate
language.167

A policy reason for precluding a cure after a foreclosure judgment
has been entered, is to prevent the problem of the unsatisfied foreclosure judgment. 6" The problem may be briefly outlined. Assume de-

158.
159.
160.
then finds
.161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
,166.
167.
-168.

Id.
Id.
Id. The reasoning of this court is not consistent. It finds § 1322(b)(5) inapplicable and
§ 1322(b)(3) likewise inapplicable because §§ 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5) apply.
Maiorino. 15 Bankr. at 257; Pearson. 10 Bankr. at 194-95.
Maiorino. 15 Bankr. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 257-58. See also Pearson. 10 Bankr. at 195; Canady. 9 Bankr. at 430.
Maiorino, 15 Bankr. at 257-58.
Id. at 258.
Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (Supp. 1980).
Pearson. 10 Bankr. at 194-95.
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acceleration of the mortgage and curing of the default were permitted
after a foreclosure judgment. Once the Chapter 13 repayment plan is
completed by the debtor, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court terminates. A problem arises because the creditor, who still holds the
valid foreclosure judgment, could then enforce it in a state court,
thereby compelling immediate payment of the balance of the mortgage.169 This enforcement could be maintained in spite of the actions of
the debtor to pay his arrearages and regular installments during the
life of the plan. 170 These judgments are clearly not invalidated by the
literal language of Section 1322(b)(5). 171 Again, this view states that
an inference can be made that Congress recognized this problem of
unsatisfied judgments and chose not to supply Section 1322(b)(5) with
the authority to cure defaults after a final foreclosure judgment.17 As
a result, the state court is faced with a dilemma in handling these judgments.173 In addition, this problem exposes the debtor to a large liability risk-paying the remaining mortgage balance in one lump sum or
losing his home. 174
A second policy reason for adopting the more restrictive view is to
prevent a negative impact on the economy. To allow curing of defaults
after a foreclosure judgment would create uncertainty and potentially
serious negative implications for the debtor and creditor.175 Allowing
de-acceleration and reactivation of mortgages would adversely affect
the residential mortgage market by making these mortgages less attractive to investors.17 With fewer investors in the home mortgage market,
fewer resources of funds would be available, resulting in fewer loans
extended to consumers. The impact on consumers would be that fewer
could afford to buy homes. This, in turn, would directly
cause a nega177
tive impact on the housing and building markets.
The serious negative implications resounding from such a course of
action should not be imputed to Congress unless there is clear evidence
of such a legislative intent.1 7 ' A review of the legislative history shows
no such intent exists to justify this devastation to the mortgage
market.179

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. at 194.
174. Id.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. at 195.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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In comparing Chapter 11 to Chapter 13, this view adopts the proposition of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.'8° The argument fol-

lows that Congress recognized the importance of accelerated debts in
Chapter 11 and provided appropriate provisions to allow the business
debtor to de-accelerate debts. At the same time, Congress consciously
chose not to make such relief available to consumer debtors in Chapter
8 Since Congress chose not to apply the de-acceleration provision
13.161
to Chapter 13, bankruptcy courts should not act as super-legislatures to
accomplish the same by reading Section 1124 into Chapter 13.182

The debtor, following a foreclosure judgment, is not without a
remedy. The debtor still has the right of redemption to pay off the total
mortgage and keep his home. Although the approach adopted by this
view may lead to harsh results for the debtor, the legislature, and not
the courts, is the proper forum for additional relief.18 3 The court should
not be used by the debtor "to effect only a delay of the inevitable rights
of [creditors] .... ."
C. The Debtor May Not Use Section 1322(b)(5) To Cure Anytime
After The Mortgage Has Been Accelerated.
The third view is the most conservative view. This view states that
once the mortgage debt is accelerated, the plain meaning of Section
1322(b)(5) prevents a debtor from curing the default. 185 This view follows much of the same logic as the second view, but it is more severe in
its application. The underlying rationale of the third view is that once
the mortgage is accelerated, it immediately becomes payable in full,
much the same as a demand note. In other words, the debt changes
"from one payable at some time in the future and in installments, to
one immediately payable in full." 1 " The debtor loses the right to pay
the arrearages or to reinstate the mortgage. Since the debt is due in
full and before the last payment under the Chapter 13 plan, Section
1 87
1322(b)(5) cannot be used to cure.
The courts supporting this view point out that by allowing a cure
once the mortgage is accelerated would not only be contrary to the

180.

This phrase is a maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one

thing is the exclusion of another.
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521 (5th ed. 1979).

181. Jenkins, 14 Bankr. at 750. See Canady, 9 Bankr. at 430.
1:82. Jenkins. 14 Bankr. at 750-51.
183. Id. at 751.
184. McCurdy, 21 Bankr. at 540.
185. See, e.g., Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Soderlund, 18 Bankr. 12 (S.D. Ohio 1981); In
re Allen, 17 Bankr. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Williams, 11 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1981); In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
186. LaPaglia. 8 Bankr. at 943.
187. Soderlund, 18 Bankr. at 16; Allen, 17 Bankr. at 123-24.
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literal reading of Section 1322(b)(5), but would also violate Section
1322(b)(2).' 8 Curing a default is equal to modifying the creditor's
claim. Likewise, to allow the debtor to reinstate the mortgage would
allow a modification of the creditor's claim on the debtor's residence.
Modification of a creditor's claim secured by an interest in the debtor's
residence isprohibited by Section 1322(b)(2). s Thus, the debtor is
not permitted to cure a default or reinstate the mortgage after it has
been accelerated.
These courts also support the proposition that Section 1322(b)(3)
cannot be used when Section 1322(b)(2) and Section 1322(b)(5) apply. 1 0 It is asserted that Section 1322(b)(5) must be read in conjunction with Section 1322(b)(2),. 9 Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits modifications of claims secured by an interest in the debtor's residence."'
Section 1322(b)(5) is seen as an exception to or subset of Section
1322(b)(2)." 93 These two provisions apply specifically to long-term, residential mortgages.'" On the other hand, Section 1322(b)(3) generally
allows the curing of any defaults.'"5 By statutory interpretation, the
specific provision rules the general, or in other words, where Sections
1322(b)(2) and (b)(5) apply, Section 1322(b)(3) may not.'" Thus, a
consistent reading of Section 1322(b) finds Section 1322(b)(3) inapplicable in this instance.19 7 The legislative history can arguably be interpreted to support such a proposition. 98
Additionally, an emphasis is placed on the role of state courts in
determining the rights of the creditor and debtor.'" The ability to cure
a default under state law is generally extinguished upon the acceleration of the mortgage.200 The filing of a foreclosure action is evidence of
or constitutes such an acceleration.' 01
Furthermore, this view contends it is proper for the court to use
state law to determine the creditor's and debtor's rights before applying

Williams, 11 Bankr. at 506.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Soderlund, 18 Bankr. at 15-16; Allen, 17 Bankr. at 123; Williams, I I Bankr.
188.

at 506.
191. LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. at 940.
192. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
193. Williams, II Bankr. at 506.
194. Id. 124 CONG. REC. S17,423 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
195. i U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
196. Williams, 11 Bankr. at 506.
197. Id.
198. Id. 124 CONG. REC. S17,423 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
199. See, e.g., Allen, 17 Bankr. at 122; LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. at 941.
200. Id.
201. LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. at 942.
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federal bankruptcy law.'" Where state law provides for the acceleration of mortgage payments this serves as a valid exercise of state law
and does not interfere with any clearly expressed policy of Chapter
3.01 Only in those states whose laws permit payment of arrearages to
cure a default after acceleration may Section 1322(b)(5) be utilized to
cure a default after acceleration.2 4
Another contention is that no clearly enacted federal policy regarding Chapter 13 exists.20 ' Thus, there is no policy to be frustrated
by a strict application of Section 1322(b)(5).'" Also, since there is no
literal language conflict between Section 1322(b)(5) and the acceleration clause, there is no reason to invalidate state law.' °" Most importantly, without any express policy regarding Chapter 13, there is no
reason for courts to impose an overbroad interpretation of federal
8
0

law.2

In addition, there is no justification for reading provisions of Chapter 11 into Chapter 13 to give the consumer-debtor broader curing
rights. By virtue of the language present in Section 1124, Congress was
aware of the problems presented by accelerated debt. Absence of simi-

lar language in Chapter 13 can be plausibly interpreted as evidence of
a conscious choice by Congress not to give such broad curing powers to
the consumer-debtor.20"
Finally, adopting this narrow view of Section 1322(b)(5) will not

encourage creditors to accelerate mortgage debts on insignificant defaults. 210 There is no real fear of a race to the courthouse by the credi-

tor and debtor.' Banks and lenders historically are hesitant to foreclose on mortgages. Creditors do not like to invest the necessary time
and expense to prosecute a foreclosure. Instead, they prefer to allow the
debtor a number of months to make up his arrearages. It is only after

202. Id. at 941.
203. Allen, 17 Bankr. at 122-23.
204. LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. at 945. The court lists the applicable statutes from the following
states: California, Colorado, Idaho. Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah. Id.
205. Allen, 17 Bankr. at 123. The Allen court contends that any policy, if found to exist,
must be inferred from Chapter 11 and such an inference is improper. Id.
206. Id. In other words, the strict application would allow no cure after the acceleration of
the mortgage debt since there is no conflict with federal policy.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Allen. 17 Bankr. at 123; Williams, II Bankr. at 506.
210. LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. at 945.
211. Id. A fear posed by some courts is that a race will ensue between the creditor who will
try to accelerate and foreclose on the mortgage, and the debtor who will try to file for Chapter 13
relief before his mortgage is accelerated. See DiPierro v. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 9 (2d
Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file).
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this reasonable time has elapsed that creditors take legal action to protect their interests.'1 Thus, the court system should not be used as an
instrument of the debtor to forestall the contractual or legal rights of
the creditor. a13
VI.

EVALUATION

An evaluation of the three views demonstrates that the broadest
view is the more viable interpretation of Section 1322(b)(5). This view,
which allows the debtor to cure until the residence is sold in foreclosure, best fits within the overall concept of Chapter 13."' It most
strongly supports the goals of Chapter 13 to rehabilitate the consumerdebtor and provide him with a "fresh start". 1 5 Finally, the only court
of appeals decision discussing the issue strongly argues in support of

this stance."
A comparison of the three views further demonstrates that the
broad view is the most viable. First, the argument that acceleration or
a foreclosure judgment precludes use of Section 1322(b)(5) because the
debt is due in full within the plan period217 overlooks the common
meaning of curing a default. 18 The power to de-accelerate and reinstate a mortgage follows from the common meaning of curing a default
held throughout the Bankruptcy Code.2'9 These powers are, consequently, within Section 1322(b)(5) and may be used to cure a default
even if it is accelerated or part of a foreclosure judgment." 0 The express language of Section 1322(b)(5) provides no limit on when it may
be used." 21 Also, acceleration of a mortgage does not eliminate the
212. LaPagliao 8 Bankr. at 945.
213. Id.
214. See DiPierro v. Taddeco, 15 Bankr. 273, 275-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, No. 81-5053
(2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); First Inv.
Co. v. Custer, 18 Bankr. 842, 846 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); DiPierro v. Cullen (In re Taddeo), 9
Bankr. 299, 305 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), affid, 15 Bankr. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, No. 81-5053
(2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. I, 1982, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file).
215. See supra notes 53 & 57 and accompanying text.
216. DiPierro v. Taddeo, No. 81-5053 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982, on
LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file).
217. See Percy Wilson Mortgage and Fin. Corp. v. McCurdy, 21 Bankr. 535 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1982); In re Maiorino, 15 Bankr. 254 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); Advance Mortgage Corp. v.
Land, 14 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); Retreat Inv. Corp. v. Canady, 9 Bankr. 428
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). See also Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Soderlund, 18 Bankr. 12 (S.D.
Ohio 1981); In re Allen, 17 Bankr. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Williams, 11 Bankr. 504
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981); In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). See supra text
accompanying notes 152, 185-87.
218. Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 8.
219. Id. The Second Circuit points out that §§ 365(b), 1110(a), and 1168(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 all use this concept of cure. Id.
220. Id.
221. Mid Am. Credit Union v. Davis, 16 Bankr. 473, 475 (D. Kan. 1981).
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other terms of the mortgage contract, particularly the original schedule
which can easily be used to meet the requirement of "last payment"
under Section 1322(b)(5)."2
The narrower views argue that state law precludes reinstatement
or cure of the mortgage. Once a foreclosure judgment is entered, the
mortgage merges with the judgment and may not be reactivated. 3
The counter-argument is that merger does not extinguish the mortgage.
It still exists and may be subject to cure."'
Another argument, made in support of these restrictive views is
that Section 1322(b)(3), the general curing provision, may not be used
when Sections 1322(b)(5) and (b)(2) apply. s25 Two points may be
raised in response to this contention. Initially, these narrow views generally insert this argument after concluding Section 1322(b)(5) does
not apply.2" There is a flaw, however, in this logic. If Section
1322(b)(5) may not be used, why should Section 1322(b)(3) be denied? 227 Second, in supporting the broad view, there is no real need to
rely on Section 1322(b)(3) to conclude curing is justified."'
Curing a default and reinstatement of a mortgage are both
equated with modification under the strict view. These actions of modification by a debtor are prohibited by Section 1322(b)(2).22 The broad
view's response is a premise of their view. The power to cure does not
mean modification. Section 1322(b)(5) is separate from, not
subordinate to Section 1322(b)(2).230 Further, the concept of cure in
the legislative history of Section 1322(b) is treated as a separate concept from modification. 3

222. Custer, 18 Bankr. at 847. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
223. See In re Maiorino, 15 Bankr. 254 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Jenkins, 14 Bankr.
748 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); Advance Mortgage Corp. v. Land, 14 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981); In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Retreat Inv. Corp. v. Canady, 9
Bankr. 428 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). See also In re Allen, 17 Bankr. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981); In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); See supra text accompanying notes
153-56, 199-201.
224. DiPierro, 15 Bankr. at 276; In re Smith, 19 Bankr. 592, 594 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982);
Cullen, 9 Bankr. at 306; United Companies Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 Bankr. 178, 189 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1980).
225. See Jenkins, 14 Bankr. at 749-50. See also Soderlund 18 Bankr. at 15-16; Allen, 17
Bankr. at 123; Williams 11 Bankr. at 506. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60, 190-98.
226. See generally Jenkins, 14 Bankr. at 749-50.
227. Id. The reasoning of this court is not consistent. It finds § 1322(b)(5) inapplicable and
then finds § 1322(b)(3) likewise inapplicable because §§ 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5) apply.
228. See generally supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
229. See Williams, II Bankr. at 506. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
230. See Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 11 10-11. See supra text accompanying notes
118-21.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. IV 1980). See Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at I 11. See
supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
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Additionally, both narrow views assert, to some extent, authorizing
acceleration and foreclosure does not conflict with the literal language
of Chapter 13 nor with any clearly expressed federal policies and therefore, should be enforced. 82 In support of the broad view, however, it is
noted that the state law in fact does impinge upon the federally enacted policies of Chapter 13 . 2 38 Application of state law, either by enforcing an acceleration or foreclosure judgment, limits the goal of rehabilitation of the debtor, provides the debtor with fewer rights than
previous bankruptcy laws, and usually restricts the debtor's rights
before foreclosure. The Second Circuit firmly stated that it did not believe Congress would work so hard for so long on the question of consumer rehabilitation just to submit the consumer to the mercies of state
law.'
In addition, the argument that a specific provision for de-acceleration of a mortgage found in Chapter 11 and not in Chapter 13 proves
Congress consciously chose not to provide this relief to Chapter 13
debtors2 8 5 is a shallow argument. While there is an argument under the
broad view to read the two chapters together,23 the better interpretation is that the specific provision in Chapter 11 is not necessary in
Chapter 13.117 De-acceleration is within the power to cure.2 " Congress
9
demonstrated no choice in Chapter 13 to prohibit de-acceleration.23
Finally, the policy factors weigh heavily in favor of the broad view
of Section 1322(b)(5). The argument that there is no express federal
policy (by the strict view)24 0 is without merit. Express policy is articulated throughout the various sources of legislative history of Chapter
13.241 Also, from a reading of Chapter 13 as a whole, one can easily
detect the clear goals of rehabilitating and providing a "fresh start" for

232. See Maiorino. 15 Bankr. at 257-58; LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. at 941, 945. See also In re
Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Retreat Inv. Corp. v. Canady, 9 Bankr. 428
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 164-67, 202-03.
233. See Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 14; Davis, 16 Bankr. at 475; Cullen, 9 Bankr.
at 303; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, art. VI, cl. 2.
234. See Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 771, 16. See supra text accompanying notes 14044.
235. See Jenkins, 14 Bankr. at 750-51; Canady, 9 Bankr. at 430. See also Allen, 17 Bankr.
at 123; Williams, I I Bankr. at 506. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82, 209.
236. See I1 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (Supp. IV 1980); Davis, 16 Bankr. at 475; Cullen, 9 Bankr.
at 303.
237. See Taddeo. No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 14; Thompson v. Great Lakes Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 17 Bankr. 748, 753 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes
132-33.
238. See Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 7 8. See supra text accompanying note 105.
239. See Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 753.
240. See LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. at 945.
241. See supra notes 53-57.
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the debtor. 4 '
The policy argument made by the second view that a broad application of the curing power will lead to a severe impact on the home
mortgage market"" seems unlikely. The number of homeowners who
file for a Chapter 13 reorganization is not significant. In addition, since
the collateral interests of the mortgage-creditor are fully protected
under a Chapter 13 plan, even using a broad interpretation of Section
1322(b)(5), the investor of funds is not likely to be fearful of this investment situation and withdraw his funds.
Another policy argument by the second view concerns the problem
of unsatisfied foreclosure judgments.'" These judgments may very well
pose a dilemma for the state courts. But, in light of the curing action
accomplished by the debtor during the Chapter 13 plan, the equitable
arm of the court will likely tilt in his favor.
The spirit of rehabilitation of the debtor supports the policy of protection of the debtor's home.'" To adopt a more narrow application of
cure would render almost non-existent the relief and protection for the
debtor."' It would also encourage both parties to race to the courthouse where the debtor is at a marked disadvantage." 7
Adoption of the broad application would tend to encourage the
debtor and creditor to spend more time in negotiation before approaching the court. This negotiation would more likely be in good faith."' A
broad application would protect the assets of the debtor from a wasteful, forced sale.'" Consequently, it would preclude preferential treatment of the mortgage-creditor as compared to other creditors."
In sum, the broad view provides the creditor with protection of his
interest to the same degree as a foreclosure judgment in state court,
but supports the rehabilitative goal of Chapter 13 by allowing the
debtor to cure his default and keep his home."'
VII.

CONCLUSION

Section 1322(b)(5) should be broadly interpreted to allow the
242. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
243. See Pearson, 10 Bankr. at 194-95. See supra text accompanying notes 175-79.
244. See Pearson. 10 Bankr. at 194-95. See supra text accompanying notes 168-74.
245. See DiPierro, 15 Bankr. at 275-76; Custer, 18 Bankr. at 846; Cullen. 9 Bankr. at 305.
See also Davis, 16 Bankr. at 475; In re Breuer, 4 Bankr. 499, 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
246. See Custer, 18 Bankr. at 847-48; Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 753. See supra text accompanying note 112.
247. See Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 9; Thompson, 17 Bankr. at 753. See supra text
accompanying note 113.
248. See Taddeo, No. 81-5053, slip op. at 1 9. See supra text accompanying note 114.
249. See Custer, 18 Bankr. at 847. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
250. See Custer. 18 Bankr. at 847.
251. Davis. 16 Bankr. at 475; DiPierro, 15 Bankr. at 275; Breuer, 4 Bankr. at 501.
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debtor to cure a default on his mortgage at any time before a foreclosure judgment. This interpretation best meets the overall objectives of
Chapter 13 to rehabilitate the debtor and to provide him with a "fresh
start." To interpret curing a default as encompassing the power to deaccelerate and reinstate a mortgage follows from the common meaning
of curing a default used throughout the Bankruptcy Code.
Enforcement of acceleration clauses and foreclosure judgments
under state law conflicts with the application of Section 1322(b)(5) to
cure a default and with the objectives of Chapter 13. Where state law
conflicts with federal laws and objectives, state law must give way. A
broad interpretation provides the creditor with the same protection supplied by state law, and it more importantly supports the rehabilitative
goal of Chapter 13.
Ann B. Miller
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